Responsible Statecraft

This summer, tensions in Kosovo have spiked even as a NATO-led peacekeeping mission began to withdraw from the country. In July, police detained 37 Serbs at a commemoration in Gazimestan, and days later searched worshippers at a monastery near Prizren. Later that month, a Serb farmer from the village of Dren was pulled from his home by Kosovo Police, tied to a tree and beaten badly enough to require intensive care in Belgrade. Then, in August, a state-owned excavator demolished seventeen Serb-owned houses, claiming they were illegal. The European Union called the conduct of the Kosovo state in all of these cases concerning, but it did nothing to stop them. It was against this background that the KFOR mission — the NATO-led peacekeeping mission created in the wake of the Western intervention in Kosovo in 1999 — announced its gradual withdrawal from the bridge in Mitrovica, which has become a symbol of the division between ethnic Serbs in the country’s north and ethnic Albanians in the south. Justifying the move, KFOR cited an improved security situation in the country. Serbs protested, while Belgrade called the move premature. After nearly three decades of international administration, why should KFOR’s stepping back cause such fear? Kosovo has been the site of one of the most ambitious international state-building projects undertaken by the United Nations, with more than $2 billion spent in the first decade alone; per capita, it has received 25 times more money and 50 times more troops than Afghanistan did. NATO held the security framework in place, and the United States stood behind the effort, having pushed its allies to bomb Yugoslavia in 1999 and later backed Kosovo’s independence. After 27 years, what is it leaving behind? ### What the bridge held back In the months after NATO’s intervention in 1999, Kosovo saw major ethnic violence. By most estimates, some 200,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians were driven from their homes in reprisals. Those who remained faced killings and harassment, while churches were burned, and homes and land seized. Much of this happened in front of an international presence that did little to stop it. At the time it was called reprisal for what Albanians had endured under Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, a framing that made the violence appear justified while deflecting attention from the mission’s failure to prevent it. One part of Kosovo escaped this. As the Yugoslav state withdrew, residents of North Mitrovica organized their own defense. As violence spread across Kosovo, they blocked the bridges to the south, keeping it from reaching the last urban area in Kosovo from which Serbs had not been driven out. Violence never reached the north. The “bridge watchers” succeeded largely because KFOR accepted the river as the defense line, placing tanks at the crossings and backing their effort. The arrangement, tailored to the security context, has been criticized ever since for reinforcing Kosovo’s ethnic divisions and tolerating what critics called the “bridge gang,” though critics have failed to offer workable alternatives. By 2001 a separate political order had consolidated in the north, resisting the state structures emerging under UNMIK, the United Nations interim civil administration in Kosovo. Behind the bridge, those who had organized the defense preserved and reorganized the remnants of the Yugoslav administration, including its courts, municipalities, university, and medical system. The UN came to call them “parallel institutions.” ### Dismantling the north Although the UN had declared the northern institutions illegal from the outset, it also tolerated them for years, recognizing their role in maintaining order and providing services for a population it could not otherwise reach. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, Washington backed the EU to take the lead in Kosovo, seeing the leverage of EU membership as a means to broker a political compromise. The EU assumed the UN's role as state-builder and mediator, adopting a more radical approach. Declaring the north a “black hole,” it made dismantling the order a central objective of the Brussels-led dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. While justified by Brussels on security grounds, this was effectively a step in consolidating Kosovo’s sovereignty. The legal ambiguity surrounding Resolution 1244, which authorized KFOR and UNMIK, and the fact that five EU member states did not recognize Kosovo did not slow the process. By 2011, dismantling the north had become conditio sine qua non of Kosovo’s state building. This required a partner in Belgrade, which had not yet established diplomatic relations with Kosovo. No Serbian government was willing to make such a bargain, even as the country sought EU membership. The north depended on Belgrade, but that dependence never translated into political obedience. Its population had been united in resisting integration into the Kosovo state, leaving little room for Serbia to maneuver. Giving up the north would also have been politically unsurvivable at home. The EU’s partner arrived in 2012. The newly elected SNS government led by Aleksandar Vučić embraced the Brussels agreement in 2013 while continuing to campaign at home on nationalist slogans. In return, Belgrade was given a free hand to monopolize Serb political life in north Kosovo through Srpska Lista**,** effectively the party’s local branch, sidelining anyone opposed to the deal. In exchange for dismantling their institutions, Serbs in the north were promised the Association of Serb Municipalities, a limited form of self-government inside Kosovo’s legal system. It was a thin substitute for what was being removed, but even that was never delivered. Priština offered successive reasons for not implementing its side of the agreement, while Belgrade could do little more than complain. The situation deteriorated further when Albin Kurti returned to power in 2021. He rejected the Brussels framework and pursued the extension of Kosovo’s authority in the north through a series of coercive measures, including the phaseout of the Serbian dinar, enforcement of Kosovo license plates, the seizure of municipal buildings, and the installation of Albanian mayors after local Serbs boycotted the elections. Kosovo also increasingly deployed special police units in the north, leading to repeated confrontations and arrests of Serbs. Then came Banjska. On September 24, 2023, an armed Serb group clashed with Kosovo Police in the village of Banjska, killing one Kosovo police officer. Three attackers were also killed in the ensuing exchange of fire. The operation was organized by the deputy leader of Srpska Lista, Milan Radoičić, who crossed into Serbia and remained there. The population was left to pay the price. Pristina used the attack to harden its position, turning the north into a place of constant policing and increasingly coercive state control. ### What is left behind Throughout all of this, KFOR remained, the last layer of protection in case something went wrong. Its announced departure therefore unsurprisingly alarmed the remaining Serb community. The mission was never meant to be permanent, and the timing has little to do with the north itself. In May, Washington declared in its Report to Congress on U.S. policy in the Western Balkans that it no longer intends to act as the region’s overseer. For twenty years, however, American pressure was one the few things constraining Priština. Europe, which had taken over the Kosovo file, produced statements throughout the latest crisis, but few of them stopped Priština from tightening its grip on the north. Belgrade had signed away the north a decade ago and had little left to trade for it. The Brussels agreement was hailed as a major success of EU policy in the Balkans, but the security situation only got worse. People have little choice but to leave, and increasingly, they do. What remains after NATO, then, is a question. Will northern Kosovo become yet another emptied area in the Balkans? And how many people have to go before anyone reassesses what was built in Kosovo?

Vice President JD Vance said Monday that Washington was in direct contact with the Houthis as the group solidified its gains across Yemen’s Red Sea coast, arguing that the U.S. is “on top of” the rapidly deteriorating situation in the country. “We’ve been in constant contact with the Emiratis, the Saudis, and others who are affected in the region,” Vance told reporters. “We’ve also been engaged in direct conversations with the Houthis themselves,” he added, describing the situation as “fluid” and “dynamic.” However, the Houthi political bureau has denied the White House’s claims that the two sides are in direct contact. The Houthis, a group also known as Ansar Allah, have made a series of rapid gains in recent days, seizing the Red Sea port of Mokha and several strategic islands near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, one of the world’s most important shipping chokepoints. The advance has renewed large-scale fighting in Yemen and triggered Saudi airstrikes, while the Houthis have also launched missiles and drones at targets inside Saudi Arabia. On Tuesday, a Saudi military spokesperson said attacks had injured 13 people across three cities in the Kingdom, while the Houthis say Riyadh launched more than 50 strikes during a 24-hour period Monday. More than 100,000 people have been displaced as the conflict has intensified. The U.S. has been in a ceasefire with the Houthis since May 2025, when President Donald Trump announced the end of its daily bombing campaign in Yemen, which killed 208 civilians. Trump suggested recently that Washington would remain committed to the ceasefire and refrain from direct attacks in Yemen. He added that “most ships go through” the Red Sea, with the exception of Saudi vessels. However, maritime shipping experts say that while non-Saudi ships are getting through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, insurance prices are expected to spike after the Houthi takeover. Regular traffic through the strait was already depressed, and is expected to be impacted even further. Twenty-one commodity ships traveled through theBab-el-Mandeb strait on Monday, according to Kpler, down from 28 on Sunday, and an average of 70 before the most recent crisis in the Red Sea. Trump reportedly recently declined to directly intervene in the conflict despite urging from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “So far, Trump demurred when MBS asked him to reinitiate military action against Houthi positions,” Annelle Sheline, Middle East research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told Responsible Statecraft. “Even if Trump eventually feels pressured by rising oil prices to attack Yemen in hopes of getting Ansar Allah to allow Saudi Arabia to export oil through the Bab al-Mandeb, such military operations are likely to be ineffective, as they were under Biden in 2024 and under Trump in 2025.” Instead of repeating a failed strategy, Sheline added, Washington should push Riyadh to “to try a new approach: listen to the Houthis. Lift the blockade. Stop pouring resources into the anti-Houthi militias. Develop a working relationship with Ansar Allah, and use that to reduce their relationship with Tehran.”

On August 27, Reps. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) and Bill Keating (D-Mass.) introduced the SRBIJA Act, which would impose sanctions and visa restrictions on “malign actors” accused of undermining democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and stability in the Western Balkans. The proposed legislation also threatens sanctions on Serbia if Belgrade maintains its relationships with Russia, China, and Iran. The initiative comes as Serbia prepares for snap parliamentary elections next month, following nearly two years of anti-government protests and shortly after Washington and Belgrade launched a new Strategic Dialogue. In Serbia’s polarized political environment, supporters of President Aleksandar Vučić portray Wilson and Keating as hostile foreign actors seeking to dictate Belgrade’s foreign policy, while opponents of the government largely see the SRBIJA Act positively and hope it will “ultimately lead to [Vučić’s] downfall,” said Nikola Mikovic, a Serbian geopolitical analyst. The SRBIJA Act’s sponsors hope their legislative push will pressure Belgrade to abandon its delicate balancing act between the West, Moscow, and Beijing. But the bill could instead give Vučić an opportunity to strengthen the geopolitical narrative that he has shrewdly navigated a multipolar world, which resonates with many Serbian voters and has helped keep him at the helm. ### Engaging Belgrade pragmatically The SRBIJA Act does not represent the Trump administration’s approach to Serbia, underscored by the newly established Strategic Dialogue. Launched in July, it provides an institutional framework for continued bilateral engagement and cooperation across areas including energy and economics. The Trump administration will not abandon that framework because of a single bill in Congress. Vladimir Trapara, a Belgrade-based political analyst, said the congressional initiative “stands poor chances of success” and argued that its failure could, if anything, help boost the Serbian government’s popularity at home. The handling of NIS — Serbia’s oil giant, in which a pair of Russian state-owned companies control a majority stake — illustrates the more complicated reality of Washington’s approach. The Trump administration has granted sanctions waivers to NIS while Belgrade works to resolve the company’s Russian ownership structure. On August 28, Serbia secured another U.S. waiver, giving the company additional time as negotiations continue over the potential sale of the Russian stake. In sum, the Trump administration continues engaging with Belgrade even while pressing Serbia’s government on issues where interests clash. The Trump-Vučić relationship, meanwhile, has so far fallen short of the close personal partnership that some observers anticipated after Trump’s 2024 electoral victory. For all the talk of an autocratic affinity between the two leaders based on shared resentment of “globalists,” there is limited evidence that such a relationship has emerged. “Vučić has quite desperately attempted to meet with Trump, even traveling to Mar-a-Lago to do so, and has always been thwarted in his efforts,” noted Lily Lynch, editor-in-chief of the Balkanist Magazine. Lynch explained that Serbia’s government has “settled into a pragmatic, if somewhat distrustful, relationship with the [second] Trump administration.” Whatever expectations existed in Belgrade in late 2024 and early 2025 that the second Trump administration would dramatically shift U.S. policy toward the Western Balkans to align much more closely with Serbia, Washington’s approach has so far appeared more transactional. The region remains relevant to the United States because of energy, regional stability, Russia, China, Kosovo, and European integration, but those interests compete with a much wider set of priorities. Ultimately, the Trump administration is simultaneously pressuring Belgrade and seeking to continue cooperation. Nothing suggests that Washington is preparing to abandon its relationship with Serbia. Consecutive administrations, going back at least as far as the 2000s, have seen U.S. engagement with Serbia as necessary for stability in the Western Balkans. Belgrade’s arms transfers to Ukraine and Israel have also helped insulate Serbia’s government from criticism from officials in Washington over its refusal to implement European sanctions on Russia. ### Balancing the Great Powers Congressional pressure is also unlikely to produce a dramatic pivot in Serbian foreign policy. Belgrade has already been incrementally moving closer to the West while maintaining its broader strategy of balancing among competing powers. This is particularly visible in Serbia-Russia relations. Belgrade has maintained ties with Moscow while cooperating with Western governments and supporting Ukraine in ways that complicate its traditional relationship with Russia. Yet these developments have not amounted to Serbia abandoning its broader balancing strategy. “Vučić is basically allowed by the West to retain this already low level of relations with Russia, in return for support to Ukraine and cooperation with the West on some other issues. On the other hand, Russia is happy to see [itself wield] at least this much…influence [as it does] in Serbia,” Trapara said. “This way, Vučić attracts support by both [the West and Moscow] for stability of his regime.” China, which has emerged as Belgrade’s most important non-Western economic and strategic partner, presents a different challenge. Beijing’s presence in Serbia is primarily economic, making the relationship structurally different from Serbia’s ties with Moscow. Miković warned that a worsening U.S.-China confrontation could eventually put Belgrade under greater pressure to distance itself from Beijing — a potentially much more difficult decision for Vučić, who traveled to China in May 2026 and hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2024. Ultimately, Serbia has strong incentives to maintain relationships with the West, Russia, and China. Vučić has built considerable political capital around presenting himself as the leader capable of navigating between them. ### Western pressure could strengthen Vučić at home Besides Wilson and Keating, other Western policymakers seek to pressure Vučić’s government. Within the European Union, for which Serbia has been a formal candidate since March 2012, criticism has intensified over Serbia’s handling of the legacy of the 1990s Balkan wars. That issue has become particularly prominent following last month’s death of Ratko Mladić, the former Bosnian Serb military commander and convicted war criminal. On September 3, a Serbian government plane flew Mladić’s body home to Serbia with his coffin wrapped in a Serbian flag. Days before Mladić’s funeral, held on September 7, EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos canceled a planned visit to Serbia, citing concerns about the glorification of Mladić, which Brussels warned “has no place in the EU or in EU candidate countries.” Just before the funeral, Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), and Rep. Keith Self (R-Texas) called on authorities in Belgrade to “refrain from any association with the planned ceremonies and to ensure that no public statement or official act memorializes Mladic as anything other than what he was: a convicted architect of genocide.” For some of Vučić’s domestic supporters, criticism from Washington or Brussels reinforces perceptions that Serbia faces unfair pressure from the West. Since Slobodan Milošević’s ouster in 2000, “the issue of Serbian support for war crimes indictees and convicted war criminals has been a constant irritant to U.S.-Serbia relations,” said Lynch. That dynamic could become particularly relevant as Serbia approaches its parliamentary elections. Western pressure could ultimately help Vučić with his core electorate. “Most of his voters have a strong focus on national issues, and they are likely to interpret this pressure as proof that Vucic is doing ‘a good job of defending Serbia’s interests,’ which is why those ‘evil Westerners’ want to overthrow him,” observed Miković. Trapara stressed how much is at stake for Serbia’s elections in terms of democratic health, the rule of law, independent institutions, a free press, and constitutionalism. At the same time, he argued that outside actors should be cautious about intervening in Serbia’s domestic affairs. “A message to the foreigners, whether they launch strategic dialogues in support of the regime, or fruitlessly threaten sanctions to help the regime anyway, is that they should refrain from big Serbia-related political moves until we finish our job in the elections.”

Only a few days ago, Moldova’s ambassador to the U.S. said it was likely “not an accident” that a Russian jet-powered drone flew across his country’s territory while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane was preparing to depart from Chișinău’s airport. Armenia, meanwhile, continues to face Russian pressure over its increasing pro-Western orientation. And tensions continue to linger on Belarus’ western and southern borders following Ukrainian allegations this summer that the country is being used to advance Russia’s war effort. Far from a disconnected smattering of events, these tensions stem from a larger regional crisis that predates — but was accelerated by — the Ukraine war. Bad U.S. policy played a crucial role in worsening this predicament. In the decades following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. pursued a dual-track approach toward former Soviet states. On the one hand, the West sought to integrate Russia — the strongest of all the new states and the USSR’s natural successor — as a junior partner into the U.S.-led liberal, capitalist world order. On the other, the U.S. and its European allies pursued a hedging policy across central and eastern Europe that included enlarging NATO up to Russia’s western borders, out of fear that Moscow’s historical autocratic and expansionist impulses would resurrect once more. That dual policy “ultimately failed,” and the hedging “proved counterproductive,” as noted by Thomas Graham, one of America’s leading Russia scholars and practitioners. The Kremlin became convinced that America’s “true goal” was “eroding and containing Russian power,” a perception that drove Russia’s leaders to be “more determined to restore their might, push back against US initiatives in the former Soviet space, and drive wedges between NATO allies.” Now that the post-Cold War unipolar era is definitively over, the U.S. must formulate a new policy toward the states stuck between NATO and Russia. This will be the key task — alongside preventing an escalation of the Ukraine war and rebalancing the trans-Atlantic relationship — for American policymakers focusing on Eurasia in the years ahead. The sum of these efforts will weigh upon two critical U.S. objectives: U.S. conventional retrenchment from Europe and the establishment of the conditions for long-term strategic stability between Russia and the West. It was with these considerations in mind that we launched a Quincy Institute initiative focused on shaping U.S. policy toward Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova — the so-called “in-between states.” In our newly-published inaugural report, we lay out a blueprint to help guide Washington’s policy toward this region in ways that will help advance America’s interests, support peace and prosperity, and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. A better approach to the in-between states would rely on a few key principles. One is that the U.S. has no vital interest at stake that necessitates it take on the risks of becoming a security guarantor for these countries. Another is that Washington should promote economic connectivity projects and political normalization efforts to strengthen Eurasian regional stability — and encourage in-between states to pursue multi-vector foreign policies that seek positive relations with all neighboring states. Equally important here is the U.S. relationship with Russia. U.S. engagement in Eurasia must be accompanied by broader confidence-building measures with Russia, aimed at mitigating the risk of security spirals and misunderstandings. This will require sustained dialogue with Moscow about what Washington is and is not doing, and the extent of its involvement in the in-between states. The Russians have demonstrated in both Georgia and Ukraine that they are willing to resort to the use of force to defend their interests in the in-between states, whereas NATO is not. The Kremlin has repeatedly made clear that it views the enlargement of the Western alliance into the in-between states as a red line. It is, therefore, eminently sensible to take off the table the future expansion of NATO into former Soviet republics. Not only does it harm the foundations of Russia-West stability, but it also leads to greater instability for transatlantic partners and the in-between states themselves. When it comes to political and economic matters, however, the U.S. and the in-between states likely have greater room for maneuver. In the context of the current security landscape, negotiating a compromise settlement to the Ukraine war will go a long way in assisting the U.S. with its other priorities across Eurasia and in the in-between states. Washington’s greatest success to date in the in-between states is the August 8, 2025, announcement of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) at a White House ceremony with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and President Donald Trump. Across Central Asia, the Caspian Basin, and the South Caucasus, American and European investments are increasing and political engagement is deepening. An important opportunity exists for TRIPP to become a key supply chain along the Middle Corridor, contributing to American efforts to strengthen U.S. access to the critical minerals essential to a modern economy and armed forces. To ensure that this deepening engagement brings economic development and security to the South Caucasus, Washington must help Yerevan and Baku implement their peace agreement and facilitate normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations. The Trump administration has achieved important successes through its engagement with Belarus, a country the U.S. had previously all but cast aside as an appendage to Russia. Pragmatic and consistent diplomatic work led to the release of several hundred political prisoners in exchange for sanctions relief. There remains much additional space for the development of political, diplomatic, and commercial ties between Washington and Minsk. A deliverable from a future potential meeting between Presidents Trump and Aleksandr Lukashenko may be full diplomatic normalization, which would open the door to increased trade and investment opportunities. Final resolution of the remaining political-territorial disputes across the region — Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia — remains elusive. Nevertheless, a negotiated end to the Ukraine war alongside broader dialogue with Russia on European security matters would set the right conditions for progress in these other areas. It’s high time for a new paradigm in the U.S. approach to the in-between states. Incorporating the strategic principles we lay out above into a new policy is vital to advancing American interests, fostering regional prosperity, and mitigating the risk of future crises in the Ukrainian mold.

The 18th summit ofBRICS, a grouping with ten members including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa, concluded in New Delhi with aleaders declaration — a clear success for an event that brought together a deeply divided group of countries, including some currently fighting on either side of a war in the Middle East. Key world leaders attended, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. There was, of course, the expected pageantry. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim evenbelted out a 1960s Bollywood hit at the leaders’ dinner party to the admiration of his Indian hosts. This success was not guaranteed. Just a few months previously, BRICS foreign ministers hadfailed to agree to a joint statement amid acrimonious exchanges between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which have exchanged missile barrages amid the ongoing war in the Middle East. Despite these serious rifts, host India managed to pull off a declaration that everyone signed on to. The price of this success, however, was much-watered down language on the Middle East war. Thesummit declaration in Rio de Janeiro last year had come out swinging, stating that “we condemn the military strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran since 13 June 2025, which constitute a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.” In New Delhi this past weekend, the grouping merely expressed “deep concern over the continued escalation of tensions in Middle East/West Asia.” It recalled “our respective national positions” and called for “exercising maximum restraint, as well as avoiding actions that could further aggravate the situation.” Admittedly, India’s task was tougher than Brazil’s had been, with the war having escalated since late February 2026 to include the UAE as a combatant. It is extremely difficult for a club to reach any sort of consensus if two of its members are physically brawling. From this perspective, the New Delhi declaration was a win for India. But it was more a relief than a victory for BRICS as a whole. The grouping did not need the distraction at this critical juncture in its journey. Beyond the Iran-U.S. war, there were other notable aspects to the declaration. Mysteriously, all references to the Ukraine conflict were dropped. The European war had been consistently mentioned in BRICS declarations since Russia invaded in 2022. Last year, the text had even included language that largely reflected the Russian position on Ukrainian attacks on three sites. One welcome new feature of the text was a paragraph on Cuba, expressing "deep concern" on the "tightening of unilateral blockade measures (and) their adverse effects on the Cuban economy...and the worrying humanitarian impact on the Cuban people.” U.S. pressure on Cuba has grown manifold since last year. Havana is now a “partner country” within BRICS, a lower tier of membership. The text was clearly a nod to its concerns. But feelings against the embargo and blockade against Cuba run high in the United Nations. Practically all member states have repeatedlygone on record opposing them. Like last year, Israel was mentioned by name and criticized for its actions in Lebanon. The text also maintained the strong language on Gaza from earlier years. Concern was expressed at "arrangements that may prejudice the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and legitimize or prolong occupation." There were no references to the U.S.-initiated "Board of Peace" in the text, even though BRICS states Egypt, Indonesia, and UAE are among itsmembers, as are partner countries Kazakhstan and Vietnam. Finally, the text expressed strong criticism of the “imposition of unilateral coercive measures that are contrary to international law,” emphasizing that “unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions, have far-reaching negative implications for the human rights, including the rights to development, health and food security, of the general population of targeted states.” It further characterized such measures as “undermin(ing) international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.” This language was a clear dig at the United States and its European allies. Many Global South states feel highly vulnerable to the U.S.-led global sanctions regime. Having launched some successful initiatives like the New Development Bank, and with its major expansion phase now behind it, BRICSfinds itself at a crossroads. The growing pains of expansion are manifest, and the outbreak of multiple wars in the world couldn’t have come at a worse time. It will take some time for new members to be adequately socialized in the grouping. Over the next year or two, BRICS will need to take a deep breath and find its footing again if it isnot to lose its mojo.